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[The author, who is LADB's Political Affairs Editor, recently visited Peru on a fact-finding trip.
Hynds lived in Peru from 1991-1994, where she worked as the general director and managing editor
of Noticias Aliadas/Latinamerica Press. The following article on evolving US anti-drug policies and
their effect on relations with Latin American countries is based on interviews that Hynds conducted
while in Peru.]
On Feb. 3, a long and often violent struggle ended at least for the moment when the Bolivian
government and the organized coca growers in that country signed an agreement through which
the government accepted the growers' demand to end forced eradication of coca fields. The
controversial practice is only one aspect of the polemic and largely unsuccessful policies imposed by
the US on Latin American countries to stem the tide of illegal drugs into the US.
At the heart of the controversy is a difference in perspective. The US attitude is that the supplier
countries are the largest part of the problem and if the supplier countries crack down on drug
operations, the US drug-abuse problem will diminish. Supplier countries, on the other hand, insist
that as long as the US, the world's largest drug consumer, continues to demand ever-increasing
amounts of illegal drugs, the suppliers will find a way to meet the demand. They contend that there
must be a more holistic and multilateral approach to the problem of illegal drugs.
Among the proposals being discussed in Latin America are legalization of the drug industry to
undermine the exorbitant profits that currently provide excessive incentives for narco kings;
decriminalization of the cultivation of coca leaf, although producing and selling cocaine would
remain illegal; programs to promote the marketing of legal products made from coca; and an
emphasis on integral regional economic development to provide campesinos a viable alternative
to growing coca (see NotiSur, 12/15/95). A costly failure In 1982, then US president Ronald
Reagan (1980-1988) declared a "war on drugs." While not the first effort to control the growing
problems associated with illegal drug consumption in the US, Reagan focused new attention and
committed new resources, including military, to the effort. The war on drugs continued and became
increasingly militarized under former president George Bush (1988-1992).
Since then, President Bill Clinton's administration has promised to make some changes in US
anti-drug policies. Nevertheless, changes in the underlying philosophy have not materialized,
nor have any significant victories been won in the ongoing war. In addition, the US efforts have
produced strong opposition in Latin America. The director of the Latin American regional office
of the Organizacion Internacional de Periodistas (OIP), Ernesto Vera, condemned the US war on
drugs. "That war is the excuse or the pretext for military and police intervention by the US in Latin
American countries," said Vera. "Washington never talks about the market for the drugs and much
less refers to its own cartels and drug lords."
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Other critics say US anti-drug policies continue to foster human rights abuses against campesinos
and encourage corruption in foreign militaries, government officials, and law enforcement bodies,
while making no real impact on the northward flow of illegal drugs. After more than a decade and
three US administrations, the belief is growing in Latin America and in some sectors in the US that
the policies imposed and the billions of dollars invested have not worked. The costs of the failure are
enormous.
The US government estimates that its population spends US$49 billion annually on illegal drugs
comparable to the GDP of Chile. That does not include economic impact from social costs such as
treating drug addiction, lost work time, and jailing offenders, which multiply by several times the
total. That amount of money makes widespread corruption inevitable. And, each day the extent of
the corruption becomes more evident. Colombian President Ernesto Samper is hanging on to his
office by a thread, accused of taking millions of dollars from the cartels for his election campaign.
Former Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gortari's brother Raul is accused of links to the
Mexican cartels. Former Bolivian president Jaime Paz Zamora (1989- 1993) was denied a visa to visit
the US for allegedly having taken money from drug traffickers while president. Several generals
have been indicted in Peru for drug trafficking. A plane left the La Paz airport last September with
over 4 tons of cocaine on board and was intercepted in Lima. In the ensuing scandal, several top
politicians in Bolivia were implicated.
US policy
US anti-drug policy in Latin America uses the "carrot and stick" approach. However, both the carrot
and the stick are unified under a required presidential "certification" that a given country is meeting
US standards to stop the flow of drugs to the US. Each year in March, the US president must certify
that specific drug producing countries are "fully cooperating" with Washington to reduce illegal
trafficking. Certification means large amounts of US anti-drug money and access to other foreign
aid, plus loans from the US and from international lenders. For those deemed not to be "cooperating
fully," additional penalties ensue, such as pressure from the US with international lenders to deny
funding. Last March, after denying them full certification, President Clinton granted a "waiver"
to Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, and Paraguay. In justifying the waiver, he said that it is in the US's
"national interest" to keep aid flowing to those countries (see NotiSur, 03/13/95).
However, the "waiver" had barely been granted when new threats and ultimatums began to
materialize regarding certification for 1996. Along with the combined carrot and stick of certification,
US policy has several prongs: money and pressure to eradicate fields dedicated to coca, poppy,
or marijuana; police and military assistance for drug interdiction and the capture of drug dealers;
and programs of crop substitution and "alternative development." But the methods used are
increasingly repressive. Ricardo Soberon of the Andean Commission of Jurists said that after initial
efforts to stop the flow of drugs failed, "We took progressively more repressive steps, such as the
voluntary and/or forced eradication of the illegal crops, plus fumigation campaigns using herbicides
and biological agents, such as Spike or tebuthieron." Latin American critics also charge that US anti-
drug policies fail to take culture into account, particularly the legitimate traditional use of coca by
large numbers of indigenous Andean people. For Dr. Hugo Cabieses, advisor to the Andean Council
of Coca Producers, traditional use must be separated from drug trafficking.
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"You have to understand that there are two completely different markets, the traditional market
and the illegal market," Cabieses told LADB. "In the illegal market the price is decided by the
drug cartels in line with the demand for coca paste in Colombia and cocaine in the US." Genaro
Ccahuana, vice president of the Council of Coca Producers, told LADB that the policies of crop
substitution and the eradication of coca fields are a total failure. "These policies were put into place
by the US without knowing our reality, without understanding the problems of poverty among
campesinos," said Ccahuana. "And they applied the policies by using police repression."
Another criticism by some politicians, local campesino leaders, and human rights workers is that
US personnel not only from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), but the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) directly participate in anti-
drug operations in Latin America. Soberon criticizes the serious consequences that result from the
militarized approach, a strategy that often includes military and nonmilitary US advisors in logistic
and intelligence support. "Extensive rural areas of the Andean countries are controlled by military
officers rather than by the elected mayors," said Soberon. "Extensive corruption and frequent
violations of human rights among the civilian population in Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia have been
evident and public through these anti-drug interdiction operations. Even more, impunity has been a
constant during the past decade."
From Mexico to Tierra del Fuego
The "big three" suppliers of the apparently insatiable US drug appetite have been Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru. However, a recent Colombian police report said that, with the major successes in
jailing cartel leaders in Colombia, the industry is moving to Mexico, making it and Brazil the likely
new Latin American drug centers. Nevertheless, almost all Latin American and Caribbean countries
are involved to some extent in the drug industry, often in money laundering or as a transshipment
point. Both Venezuela and Panama have major money-laundering operations. And, in December
1995, a US State Department report said that Uruguay was a "fiscal paradise" for laundering drug
money because of its economic stability, beneficial laws governing banking secrecy, and the lack of
restrictions on capital entering or leaving the country. The report said President Julio Sanguinetti
has a "unique opportunity" to turn the situation around by approving legislation making money
laundering a criminal offense.
In January, a UN report said that Chile is also at risk of becoming a center of money-laundering
operations in Latin America. The executive director of the UN drug-control program (Programa
para la Fiscalizacion Internacional de la Droga, PNUFID), Giorgio Giacomelli, said the expanding
economy, the modern banking system, and the constant liberalization of the market make
it attractive for all types of investments, "including those of questionable origin." And, as a
country's involvement in drug trafficking increases, so does corruption among government and
law enforcement officials. Last year in Paraguay, the head of its anti-drug agency, Gen. Ramon
Rosa Rodriguez, was assassinated and evidence suggested links between DEA agents and those
responsible for the killing (see NotiSur, 10/28/94 and 11/18/94).
According to Ricardo Soberon, the illicit drug activity props up the economies of the countries
involved. At the same time, the increase in crime serves to justify the existence of repressive
agencies, and the criminals provide a source of bribe and pay-off money for corrupt politicians
LADB Article Id:  55787
ISSN:  1060-4189
©2011  The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved. Page 4 of 8
and government workers. "Drug trafficking is an interesting form of the 'cops and robbers'
game, reflecting the incongruencies represented by this 'war' that has no end and makes no
evident sense," said Soberon. "There is no doubt that the phenomenon of drugs must be seen as
a destabilizing factor that can affect political, economic, and military security," said Giancomelli.
"Even the Southern Cone countries have become transit points for drugs and money laundering
centers, and even more importantly, every day are suffering from increasing domestic drug abuse."
Although many more countries are becoming heavily involved, there are still four major players
in Latin America: Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. Bolivia One of Latin America's most
impoverished countries and one of the most dependent on money generated from drugs, Bolivia
must placate the US while at the same time deal with the serious social and economic implications
that result from US-dictated policies. Bolivia's largely indigenous campesinos, who grow coca leaf
both for traditional religious and medicinal uses and for use in the manufacture of illegal drugs, are
becoming more organized and more militant in demanding a change in government policy.
The Chapare, the country's primary coca-producing area in the southeastern part of the nation, has
been wracked by violence as growers demand an end to the forced eradication of coca fields (see
NotiSur, 04/28/95 and 07/28/95). The difficult decision reached by many families to grow coca is
the result of the bruising poverty in rural Bolivia the most severe in South America and the lack of
opportunities for work in the cities. Many campesinos now growing coca in the Chapare were, until
ten years ago, miners working in the huge government-owned tin and silver mines.
With the drastic drop in the world price of tin in 1985, large numbers of miners found themselves
with no work. After a fruitless struggle to force the government to rehire them, many miners
migrated to the Chapare and eventually began growing coca. As part of the US-imposed eradication
program in Bolivia, campesinos are paid US$2,500 per hectare to voluntarily eradicate their coca
fields. This program has cost millions of dollars but only minimally reduced the amount of land
under coca cultivation. It is not difficult to see why. To take advantage of the policy, a campesino
must be growing coca. The more coca he is growing, the more "compensation" he can receive.
Therefore, taking advantage of the flaws in the policy, a smart campesino plants coca so that he can
be paid to stop growing it. Nevertheless, the US is adamant in pushing the eradication program,
using the threat of decertification. And, the Bolivian government and the US play an endless game
of threats to cut off funding, deadlines, police actions, protests, and extended deadlines. "The US
Congress will be much more energetic in its demands for certification of aid destined to the war
on drugs in Bolivia," warned the US Ambassador in La Paz, Curtis Kamman, in November 1995.
"However, if the Bolivian government fulfills its commitment to eradicate 5,400 ha. by Dec. 31, it is
unlikely that it will have problems with certification."
Still, a strongly worded report from the Bolivian Foreign Ministry charges that the US keeps
changing the rules of the game. "In its drug war, the US demands much from the producer countries
(Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia) and does very little for them except to break signed anti-drug
agreements," said the report. Despite Bolivia's compliance with US goals, according to the Foreign
Ministry, the US did not fulfill agreements it signed at the 1990 summit in Cartagena de Indias,
Colombia, or in San Antonio, Texas, in 1992. Both agreements called for a multilateral strategy for
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combatting drug trafficking, making alternative agricultural development a fundamental principle
and establishing a strategy of integral cooperation to combat the production and trafficking of drugs.
In light of new threats to cut funding, Minister of Government Carlos Sanchez Berzain recently
made an unexpected trip to Washington to try to convince the US government to continue funding
eradication programs and to report the fulfillment of the US-set goal of 5,400 ha. of coca eradicated
in 1995. US CIA chief John Deutch visited Bolivia in early February for talks with President Gonzalo
Sanchez de Lozada on the anti-drug efforts. According to Sanchez Berzain, "Director Deutch said
that Bolivia is one of the countries that has been most effective technically and practically in the fight
against drug trafficking." Deutch arrived in La Paz the day after 800 Bolivian campesinas entered
the capital following a month-long march from Cochabamba, 500 km southeast of La Paz, to defend
what they describe as their centuries-old right to grow coca leaf.
Despite several attempts by the police to break up the march and despite vows by the government
that they would not be allowed to march all the way to La Paz, the women managed to enter the
capital, where they held rallies in protest of the forced eradication program and police repression
in the coca- growing areas. They represent 35,000 families in the Chapare. The Bolivian government
charged that the march of the campesinas could be infiltrated by "some elements connected to drug
trafficking" and called the march "political, illegal, and distorted." When the government failed to
respond to their demands, 50 women began a hunger strike. The campesinas' demands included
a call for the decriminalization of coca leaf, the release of jailed campesino leaders, indemnization
for the families of five persons killed by anti-drug police last year, implementation of programs for
alternative agricultural development, and a revision of the anti-drug law.
On Feb. 3, a seven-point "act of understanding" was signed by Minister of Government Sanchez
Berzain; Minister of Labor Reynaldo Peters; the leaders of the labor organization Central Obrero
Boliviano (COB), Oscar Salas and Cristina Marquez; and Evo Morales, leader of the organized coca
growers. The document included the government's commitment that security forces would respect
human rights in the Chapare and end forced eradication of coca fields. In return, the union leaders
promised to end the hunger strike and the other protest measures by the campesinas.
Meanwhile, certification this year remains increasingly doubtful. Recently, a top Bolivian official
blasted the US for placing conditions on financial assistance used in the country's war on drugs.
Minister of the Presidency Guillermo Justiniano said the current arrangement with Washington
was not based on "cooperation," but rather on the US "dictating" policy. Justiniano said his
country was not prepared to be ordered around by Washington. He also said the concept of
"mutual responsibility" proposed by the US was nothing more than lip service. Foreign Minister
Antonio Aranibar also joined in the criticism of the US, saying "they want Bolivia to destroy its coca
plantations, but won't do anything to reduce US drug consumption." Colombia The influence of
the Colombian drug cartels has permeated every facet of Colombian society and may yet topple
President Ernesto Samper who is accused of taking millions of dollars in campaign contributions
from the Cali cartel (see NotiSur, 09/22/95, 01/05/96 and 01/26/96).
Thus, the relationship between Colombia and the US is extremely complicated. However, the
vicissitudes of US- Colombian relations go beyond the objective successes or lack of them on the
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part of the Colombian government to control drug trafficking. They have also been affected by
the corruption of some DEA agents, outspoken condemnations of the Colombian government by
DEA and Embassy officials, and a power-struggle within the US government over who will define
policy. With each twist and turn that has occurred in Colombia during the past two years including
the various arrests and subsequent escapes of top drug lords and the ongoing investigation into
Samper's ties to the cartels a dizzying range of responses has come from the US. These responses
have gone from praise and support for the government for the arrests of cartel bosses one day, to
demands that Colombia reinstate extradition the next, to renewed threats to decertify the country.
And the gamut of US attitudes are often expressed within the space of a few days. In December,
assistant secretary of state Robert Gelbard called the recent decision by the Colombian Congress to
shelve the investigation into Samper "evidence that this was not a serious investigation." In reply,
Foreign Minister Rodrigo Pardo said the remarks were an unjustified interference in the internal
affairs of Colombia that could not be accepted. After pointing out that the US is the major consumer
of illegal drugs and citing a report by the US Department of Health indicating that, in 1995, drug use
increased, Pardo said neither the US nor Colombia can solve the problem alone.
"The drug-trafficking problem is transnational," said Pardo. "If the demand for drugs in the
US did not exist, we would not have the serious problems that we have in Colombia from drug
trafficking." In contrast to Gelbard's remarks, however, on Jan. 11 US Ambassador Myles Frechette
praised efforts by Colombia in 1995, although he criticized the "terrible problem" of impunity.
"Objectively, the record [of the Colombian government] is very good" for 1995 compared with the
year before, said Frechette. In addition, during his visit to Bogota, CIA director Deutch offered to
increase US cooperation in the Andean nation's anti-narcotics effort despite the jail break at the
end of January of a powerful Cali cartel drug lord. Instead of threatening that Washington would
decertify Colombia as a partner in the anti-drug fight, as the US Embassy did after the escape of Jose
Santacruz Londono, Deutch extended an olive branch to the country following a war of words and
recriminations over the escape.
While the US priority in Colombia is the reinstatement of extradition of drug lords, it promotes
crop substitution there as well. Through the Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo (PLANTE), the
Colombian government hopes to substitute 90,000 ha. of coca, poppy, and marijuana in the next two
years. However, like in neighboring countries, it has had little success. "What happens is that coca
travels, by plane or by land, but it travels," said Jose Neopmuceno Quinchia, a campesino in Cauca,
southwestern Colombia. "On the other hand, legal crops have no way out of these mountains."
Peru
In the five principal coca-growing areas of Peru, the US has funded a controversial alternative
development project that has been called "grossly insufficient for the needs of the country." The
project calls for an investment from the US Agency for International Development (USAID) of US
$30 million over five years, plus US$14 from the Peruvian government. It is designed to generate
employment and income, essential services, community development, consciousness raising, and
environmental protection. By the year 2000, it will hopefully produce 6,900 full-time and 21,400 part-
time jobs, fulfill 75% of the commitment to reduce the cultivation of coca, and implement programs
for the organization of 100 communities.
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The project aims to reduce the number of hectares of traditional coca fields by 9,400 and
nontraditional (for drugs) by 9,700 within five years. "These amounts are minimal, since now there
are more than 100,000 ha. dedicated to growing coca in the country," read an article in the influential
daily newspaper El Comercio in Lima. Campesino leaders are very critical of the program. "The
government offers crop substitution and creates agencies to carry out alternative development," said
Ccahuana, "but more than 80% of the money is spent on bureaucracy setting up offices, buying cars
and what little is left goes to a program that will never result in development.
Much of what is called 'cooperation' never reaches the countryside and if it arrives, it is used to
divide the campesino organizations and cause friction among the campesinos. This is the so-called
alternative development."
Mexico
Mexico produces 70% of the marijuana and 30% of the heroin consumed in the US. In addition,
60% of the cocaine that reaches the US passes through Mexico, according to the Mexican Attorney
General's office. It is also increasingly involved in money laundering which is not a criminal offense
in Mexico and in transporting cash. Thomas Constantine, administrator of the USDEA, said recently,
"We believe that the major drug gangs operating out of Mexico pose the largest threat currently."
In addition, the administration and family of former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari have been
implicated in ties to drug lords (see SourceMex, 12/06/95).
The cartels in northern Mexico have become increasingly powerful, and have been implicated
in several recent political assassinations, including Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo, the cardinal of
Guadalajara. With the difficulties that the Colombian cartels have had recently, the Mexican cartels
from the Gulf, Jalisco, Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juarez, and Matamoros have begun moving into the open
spaces. According to Dr. Cabieses, the Mexican cartels have also been trying to promote poppy
growing in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley and the Chapare region of Bolivia (see NotiSur, 12/15/95).
One manifestation of the Mexican connection in South American drug operations was the
confiscation of more than four tons of refined cocaine at the Lima airport last September (see
NotiSur, 10/27/95). The cocaine was stashed aboard a cargo plane that originated in La Paz, Bolivia.
The plane was allegedly en route to a cartel boss in Mexico. The discovery of the illegal cargo set
off a political scandal in Bolivia. In addition, the disappearance of more than a half- ton of the
confiscated cocaine in Peru renewed charges of corruption against Peruvian law enforcement
personnel, especially within the anti-drug unit (Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el Narcotrafico,
FELCN).
More recently, the arrest of Gulf cartel boss Juan Garcia Abrego in Mexico and his forced
deportation to the US by the Mexican police, have raised much speculation regarding US- Mexican
relations vis-a-vis drug trafficking. Analysts question why President Ernesto Zedillo chose this
moment to move on Abrego and what concessions he expects from the US in return. Included in any
analysis about US drug policies in Latin America is speculation about hidden agendas.
Bolivian philosopher H.C.Felipe Mansilla says that what everyone involved in the drug scene
campesinos, governments, and traffickers want most "is something that they cannot say openly, but
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for which they discretely but intensely pray to God and to all the Christian and pagan saints: the
preservation of the present state of things, characterized by rhetorical condemnation and formal-
legal prohibition and, simultaneously, by de facto tolerance of the production and marketing of
coca and all its derivatives. This ambiguity, or better, hypocrisy, is the cause of the high prices for
the 'millennial plant' and, at the same time, the relative freedom to produce and sell the sacred
substance." [Sources: Debate Agrario (Lima), 10/95; Andean Commission of Jurist Newsletter
(Lima), 11/14/95; Latinamerica Press (Lima), 02/09/95, 03/09/95, 11/02/95; Notimex, 12/12/95, 01/17/96;
New York Times, 01/16/96, 01/20/96 01/25/96; Inter Press Service, 11/29/95, 12/11/95, 01/04/96,
01/28/96; Deutsche Press Agentur, 01/12/96, 01/19/96, 01/25/96, 02/02/96; Dow Jones News, 02/02/96;
Reuter, 11/05/95, 12/13/95, 01/05/96, 01/17/96, 01/18/96, 01/19/96, 02/01/96, 02/03/96; Agence France-
Presse, 11/08/95, 11/16/95, 11/17/95, 01/18/96, 01/28/96, 01/29/96, 02/01/96, 02/03/96, 02/04 /96]
-- End --
